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Abstract 
Participants in our study worked on an anagram task to win a prize while aversive noise played 
in the background. They were instructed to deal with the noise either by “opposing” it as an 
interference or by “coping” with the unpleasant feelings it created. The strength of attention to 
the opposing or coping response to adversity was measured by poorer recognition of the content 
of the background noise. For the “opposing” participants, it was predicted that the more they 
attended to opposing the interference, they stronger they would engage in solving the anagrams 
to win the prize, which would increase the prize’s value. For the “coping” participants, it was 
predicted that the more they attended to coping with their unpleasant feelings, the weaker they 
would engage in solving the anagrams to win the prize, which would decrease the prize’s value. 
The results supported both predictions. 
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Value From Adversity: 
How We Deal With Adversity Matters 
It is common for people to confront difficulties while they pursue their goals. Obstacles 
in the path toward a goal have to be removed.  Forces pushing back from the goal have to be 
resisted. Aversive background conditions must be dealt with. But does the value of the object of 
the goal pursuit vary depending on how we deal with the adversity? If so, this suggests new ways 
to think about how obstacles in goal pursuit affect goal engagement and value.  
 There are different perspectives regarding the impact of adversity on value. One 
perspective is that aversiveness could decrease the value of the goal object by associating that 
object with the unpleasant experience produced by the situation (e.g., Eagly & Chiaken, 1993; 
Kimble, 1961). Alternatively, from a dissonance perspective, if individuals freely choose to deal 
with a difficulty, the value of the goal object could be increased to justify having chosen an 
aversive situation (e.g., Aronson & Mills, 1959; Festinger, 1957). A third motivational intensity 
perspective proposes that the high anticipated difficulty of succeeding on a task under adverse 
conditions mobilizes energy for task engagement and this in turn increases the attractiveness of 
the goal object (e.g., Brehm & Self, 1989; Brehm, Wright, Solomon, Silka, & Greenberg, 1983).  
Our research complements these other perspectives by considering the impact on goal 
value from how the adversity is managed during goal pursuit. When people encounter adversity 
in goal pursuit, they can either redouble their focus on the task at hand (e.g., the kind of response 
to difficulty that Woodworth (1940) described as resistance, as illustrated by leaning into a wind 
that is impeding one’s progress) or they can direct their attention away from the task at hand and 
attend instead to something else, such as their unpleasant feelings. When people focus their 
             Value From Adversity     4  
  
  
 
attention on the task at hand, the more engaged they will be in focal goal pursuit, whereas when 
people attend to their feelings, the less engaged they will be in focal goal pursuit.  
We suggest that regulatory engagement theory (Higgins, 2006; Higgins & Scholer, 2009) 
can provide one answer as to how this differential engagement affects goal value. This theory 
proposes that value is not just an experience of pleasure or pain but an experience of the 
motivational force of attraction toward or repulsion away from something (cf. Idson, Liberman, 
& Higgins, 2000). Because it is a motivational force experience and not only a hedonic 
experience, there can be contributions to the overall experience of value intensity other than 
hedonic experience.  
One of the contributors to value intensity specified by regulatory engagement theory is 
how strongly people are engaged (i.e., involved, occupied, and absorbed) in goal pursuit. 
Engagement strength contributes to the intensity of the motivational force experience and thus to 
the experience of attraction or repulsion. When working toward a positive reward attained from 
successful goal pursuit, such as a prize, stronger engagement in the goal pursuit activity will 
increase (i.e., intensify) attraction toward the reward while weaker engagement will decrease 
(i.e., de-intensify) attraction. We propose that when individuals handle adversity by opposing it 
and increasing attention to the focal task, this will increase engagement in the goal pursuit, 
increasing goal value. However, when individuals handle adversity by turning their attention 
away from the focal task in order to cope with their negative feelings, this will decrease 
engagement in the goal pursuit, decreasing goal value. 
To test these predictions, the current study investigated how different kinds of 
instructions about how to handle an aversive force (an interfering background noise) influenced 
goal value (a prize associated with completing a set of anagrams) to the extent that participants 
             Value From Adversity     5  
  
  
 
handle the aversive force as instructed. While working on an anagram task, participants were 
instructed to either oppose the background noise as an interfering force or to cope with the 
unpleasant feelings it created. What is critical to test our predictions is that participants do, in 
fact, respond to the adversity of the background noise as instructed—either by paying attention 
to opposing the noise as an interfering force or by paying attention to coping with the unpleasant 
feelings it creates. Importantly, both paying attention to opposing an interference and paying 
attention to coping with unpleasant feelings means paying attention to something other than the 
background noise itself. Therefore, increased attention to dealing with the adversity as instructed, 
i.e., for both opposing and coping responses, should result in poorer memory for the specific 
contents of the noise.  
It was predicted that poorer memory for the noise content in the "opposing" condition 
would reflect a stronger response of opposing the interference as instructed, strengthening 
engagement in the focal task and thereby intensifying attraction to the prize (i.e., increasing goal 
value). In contrast, poorer memory for the noise content in the "coping" condition would reflect a 
stronger response of coping with unpleasant feelings as instructed, weakening engagement in the 
focal task and thereby de-intensifying attraction to the prize (i.e., decreasing goal value). 
Importantly, we are not predicting a main effect of instructions (opposing vs. coping) because a 
weak opposing response and a weak coping response would have opposite effects on 
engagement in the focal task and opposite effects on memory for the noise content, i.e., free up 
attention for the noise content resulting in better rather than poorer memory. What we are 
predicting, as described above, is an interaction for intensity of attraction to the prize between 
Response Type (opposing vs. coping) and Response Strength (poorer memory for the noise 
content indicating stronger opposing or stronger coping response).  
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 Method 
Participants. Sixty-nine (48 females, mean age 22 years) students from the University of 
Amsterdam were recruited to participate in a one-hour battery of unrelated studies. They 
received €7 ($11) or course credit for their participation. (There were no gender effects.) 
Procedure. The experiment was introduced as a study of performance under auditory 
distraction for problems that require verbal fluency. Participants were seated in separate cubicles, 
were asked to put on headphones, and were told that they would complete a verbal anagram task 
in the presence of different background noises in order to simulate real-world conditions in 
which ambient noises are sometimes present in people’s working environments. They were 
further told that if they performed well, they could earn a lottery ticket with a 10% chance of 
winning a $10 prize certificate to a bookstore or a movie theater close by (type of prize was 
counterbalanced). Participants were given practice anagrams to ensure they understood the task. 
They were encouraged to work quickly and accurately to solve as many anagrams as possible 
during an eight-minute period.    
The participants were randomly assigned to one of two instructions for how they should 
deal with the background noise they would hear while working on the task. Participants in the 
“opposing” condition were told, “the background noise is something you will have to overcome 
in order to attend to the task”, and “to do well on the task, you will need to overcome the 
distraction and oppose its interference.”  Participants in the “coping” condition were told, “the 
background noise is a bit of a nuisance to cope with. It is something that may cause you to feel a 
bit unpleasant—a feeling that you’ll need to cope with.” The noise was the same for everyone. It 
was a series of different animal sounds (e.g., birds, sheep, horse, bear). There were twelve 
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different sounds, each of which was played either six or seven times until the time limit for 
solving the anagrams had passed (8 minutes). 
After ostensibly checking their solutions, the experimenter told all participants they had 
won the lottery ticket for the prize. Participants indicated how much they valued this prize on a 
9-point scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 9 (very much)—the “value of the prize” primary 
dependent measure. At the end of the study, there was a surprise recognition task for the content 
of the background noise that served as our measure of attention to dealing with adversity as 
instructed. In this task, participants were presented with each of the twelve animal sounds that 
had been played during the anagram task and an equal number of animal sounds that had not 
been played before. These sounds were presented one at a time in random order. For each sound, 
participants indicated whether or not they had heard it before.  
Results 
Pilot study check of aversiveness of background noise. Twenty-five participants were 
randomly assigned to the two frame conditions and were asked to rate how pleasant and how 
unpleasant the background noise was, each on a 9-point scale ranging from 1 (not at all) to 9 
(very much). There were no differences in the ratings of how pleasant or how unpleasant the 
noise was based on framing. In both framing conditions, the noise was rated low in pleasantness 
(MOpposing = 2.58, SD =1.78; MCoping = 2.85, SD = 2.23), F(1,23) < 1, and moderately unpleasant 
(MOpposing  = 5.50, SD = 2.54; MCoping = 6.54, SD = 2.30), F(1,23) = 1.15, p > .25. We also created 
an unpleasant minus pleasant difference score. This score was significantly greater than zero in 
both the “opposing” condition (M = 2.92, SD = 3.48), t(11) = 2.91, p = .01, and in the “coping” 
condition (M = 3.69, SD = 3.43), t(12) = 3.89, p = .002, and it did not vary significantly between 
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framing conditions, F < 1. Thus, the background noise, as intended, was clearly experienced as 
unpleasant in both framing conditions. 
Memory for the background noise content to measure attention to dealing with 
adversity. The proportion of hits (correct identification of old items) and false alarms (failure to 
reject new items) from the recognition memory task were used to compute non-parametric 
measures of recognition accuracy, A′ (Grier, 1971). This index reflects the degree that each 
participant correctly discriminated correct old items from new foil items (A′), such that higher A′ 
scores reveal greater sensitivity. We reasoned that participants who paid more attention to either 
opposing or coping with the noise adversity as instructed would pay less attention to the content 
of the background noise, and this would be reflected in their having lower A’ scores, i.e., lower 
recognition memory for the background information.  
Notably, there was no significant difference between conditions in the number of 
anagrams solved correctly (MOpposing = 12.46, SD = 4.83; MCoping = 10.94, SD = 5.09; F(1,67) = 
1.61, p = .21). Anagram performance was not a significant predictor of A′, F(1,66) < 1. There 
was also no significant difference on A′ as a function of framing condition, F(1,67) = 2.33, p = 
.13 (MOpposing = .76; SD = .11; MCoping = .80, SD = .10). However, there were individual 
differences in where attention was directed within the opposing and coping conditions that, as 
predicted, influenced the value of the prize.  
Value of the prize. There were no significant main effects of either condition framing 
(i.e., response type) or A′ (i.e., response strength) on perceived prize value. However, as 
predicted, there was a significant Response Type X Response Strength interaction on value of 
the prize, B = 8.58, SE = 2.72, t(65) = 3.16, p = .002. In the “opposing” condition where they 
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were instructed to pay attention to opposing the adversity, as attention to the background noise 
decreased (i.e., poorer recognition memory A′ as a measure of a stronger opposing response), the 
value of the prize increased, B = 7.33, SE = 3.63, t(65) = 2.02, p < .05. In contrast, in the 
“coping” condition where they were instructed to pay attention to coping with their unpleasant 
feelings, as attention to the background noise decreased (i.e., poorer recognition memory A′ as a 
measure of a stronger coping response), the value of the prize decreased, B = -9.83, SE = 4.04, 
t(65) = -2.43, p = .02 (see Figure 1). Including performance on the task as a covariate, the 
Response Type X Response Strength interaction remained significant, B = 8.36, SE = 2.72, t(64) 
= 3.08, p = .003.       
General Discussion  
The results of our study supported our predictions. We found a Response Type x 
Response Strength interaction on the value of the prize. Specifically, for participants instructed 
to deal with the adverse background noise as an interference to be opposed, it was predicted that 
poorer memory for the noise content would reflect a stronger response of opposing interference 
as instructed, i.e., concentrating harder on the given task, which would strengthen engagement in 
solving the anagrams to win the prize and thereby intensify attraction toward the prize. The 
results supported this prediction. In contrast, for participants instructed to deal with the adverse 
background noise by coping with the unpleasant feelings it created, it was predicted that poorer 
memory for the noise content would reflect a stronger response of coping with unpleasant 
feelings as instructed, which would weaken engagement in solving the anagrams to win the prize 
and thereby de-intensify attraction toward the prize. The results also supported this prediction. 
Our findings extend current models of how obstacles affect goal value by providing evidence 
that how adversity is dealt with plays a critical role in whether adversity increases or decreases 
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value. According to some psychological perspectives, such as the classical conditioning 
perspective  (e.g., for reviews, see Eagly & Chiaken, 1993; Kimble, 1961), adversity associated 
with the pursuit of a positive goal object can decrease its value. According to other psychological 
perspectives, such as cognitive dissonance theory (e.g., Aronson & Mills, 1959; Festinger, 1957), 
reactance theory (e.g., Brehm, 1966; Brehm & Brehm, 1981; Wicklund, 1974), or motivational 
intensity theory (e.g., Brehm & Self, 1989; Brehm et al., 1983), adversity associated with the 
pursuit of a positive goal object can increase its value. Our findings complement these 
perspectives by applying regulatory engagement theory (Higgins, 2006; Higgins & Scholer, 
2009) to predict that dealing with adversity by opposing it as an interference versus coping with 
the unpleasant feelings it created can have opposite effects, with the former increasing value and 
the latter decreasing value. Moreover, our results show that these opposite effects on value from 
how adversity is dealt with become stronger as more attention is paid to opposing and more 
attention is paid to coping.  
Practically, this means that one could decrease the attractiveness of cigarettes by 
instructing quitting smokers to focus strongly on coping with the negative feelings associated 
with the urge to smoke, whereas one could increase the attractiveness of healthy food by 
instructing dieters to focus strongly on opposing the temptation to eat fatty snacks. Future 
research that examines how these different mechanisms (e.g., regulatory engagement, reactance, 
cognitive dissonance) could be combined to maximally increase attraction toward adaptive 
positive objects (e.g., healthy foods) or to maximally decrease attraction toward maladaptive 
positive objects (e.g., cigarettes) will be important both conceptually and in practice. 
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Figure 1. Effects of attention to dealing with adversity (high; low) and way of dealing with 
adversity (opposing interference; coping with unpleasantness) on value of prize. Predicted value 
for low attention is 1 SD above the mean for A′; high attention is 1 SD below the mean for A′.  
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